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MALICE AFORETHOUGHT
Not a few of the rules and requirements of our law which are to-day
universally received appear so fundamental as to make it difficult for us
to believe that time ever was when they were not. The requirement of
the element of malice aforethought in the crime of murder is one of
these."
See the remarks as to the presumption of malice in the recent case of Coart v.
"State (923, Ga.) Ii9 S. E. 723, 728.
[528]
COMMENTS
Actually the necessity of that malice as an essential part of murder is,
as our law goes, of comparatively recent origin.2  In determining
liability for wrongful acts, early English law did not concern itself with
either intent or malice." For a long time it knew only two classes of
homicide, justifiable and unjustifiable; in the first class fell lawful kill-
ing by an executioner, and the killing of an outlaw or a thief or a slayer
taken red-handed who resisted arrest; in the second class were put all
other killings, even those in self-defence or by misadventure. Of
murder in its modern sense as involving malice the law knew nothing
under that name; in fact a judgment of murder might be rendered
where there had been no slaying at all.5 Till 1340 nurdrum had meant
three different things-secret homicide, homicide perpetrated by the
'Thomas Buckler's Case (1552, K. B.) i Dyer (ed. 1794) 68 b, seems to be the
first reported case which definitely declares that murder implies malice aforethought.
'Legis enim est: qui inscienter peccat scienter emendet. i Liebermann, Die
Gesetze der Angelsachsen (1898) 603, Leges Henrici, 88 sec. 6, 9o sec. 11; 2
Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law (2d ed. 19o5) 470; Holmes, Com-
mon Law (i88s) ch. I; Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts (1894) 7
HARv. L. REv. 321; 3 Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History (199o) 485.
' See 2 Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. supra note 3, at p. 479, for numerous actual
cases there cited. See also 3 Holdsworth, History of English Law (2d ed. 1914)
255-261. Even after pardons for killings in self-defence have become pretty much
a matter of course (The Statute of Gloucester [1278] 6 Edw. I, c. 9) the coroner's
jury will continue to find that "J. B. of W. feloniously slew J. P. in self-defence
at W. with a dagger worth six pence, and fled after committing the felony." (1399)
Select Coroners' Rolls (9 Seld. Soc. i895) 96.
That is, till the murder fine in cases of misadventure was abolished by the
Statute of Marlborough (1267) 52 Hen. III, c. 25. In 1198 the jurors of a certain
hundred make six presentments before the itinerant justices; in four cases the
judgment is murder. The first presentment of the next hundred is also one of
murder. We give them in order: (i) "The jurors say that J, son of L, and Alice,
daughter of S, were accidentally drowned in the mill pond of E, and Englishry was
not duly presented. Murder." (2) "The same say that a certain woman was
found dead in the field of E, and it is not known who she was, and no one is
under suspicion. Judgment-murder." (3) "The same say that evil doers killed
W. S. in his home at S. and bound his son R. and wounded X. and Y. The jurors
do not know who they were. Englishry was not presented. Judgment-murder."
(4) "A certain man was found slain in the fields of Clahill, and it is not known
who he was or who killed him. Judgment-murder." (5) "The jurors say that
in the grange of the monks of C. at T. two beggars who were staying there killed
a third. Their identity is not known. Judgment-murder." I Palgrave, Rotuli
Curiae Regis (1835) 159. (I) is a clear case of accidental death without any
slaying, and (2) probably so. This result was not at all uncommon. See ibid. 202
(murder where one died from starvation); and ibid. 203 (murder where death
resulted from exposure). (3) (4) and (5) are cases of deliberate, intentional
killing. In all the cases there was no presentment of Englishry. In all there
should have been such a presentment if the hundred was to escape paying the
murder fine, but in three of the cases no presentment was possible because the slain
persons were unknown. The actual circumstances make each case easily distin-
guishable from any of the others, but in no instance is the judgment determined
by modem standards.
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mnurdrator (which would in all cases be felonious, and in some cases
homicide of a particularly heinous nature), and the murder fine.6
Whatever may have been the origin of this latter mnurdrum-it is
assigned to Cnut on evidence that is none too trustworthy-it was one
of the results of the Norman Conquest of England, that when a person
was slain and his Englishry (that is, proof in a prescribed manner that
he was English) was not presented to the coroner, the district, usually
the hundred, became liable for the murder fine." The size of this fine,
the frequency of its occurrence and the consequent burden of pa rment
which became saddled upon the hundreds, all contributed to give to the
word murdrum the primary meaning of murder fine till that was
abolished by (1340) 14 Edw. III, st. I, c. 4.8
'For the connection of inurdrum with the Teutonic mnorth, see 2 Pollock and
Maitland, op. cit. supra note 3, at p. 486. The definition of murder as secret killing
is found in Glanville, De Legibus (circa 1187) XIV 3. Bracton, De Legibus
(circa 125o) f. 134b, repeats and amplifies Glanville's definition, and then proceeds
to discuss Englishry and the murder fine, neither of which is mentioned by Glan-
vile. Cf. Fleta (circa 129o) 46. As early as 1166 the word inurdrator signified
the slayer who together with robbers and thieves became the subject of the new
procedure provided for by the Assise of Clarendon (1166) chs. I, 2, 4, 6, 17; cf.
Assise of Northampton (1176) chs. 1, 3; Br. f. II5b, classes inurdratores with
robbers and housebreakers. The use of the word murder as synonymous with
slaying of the worst kind stretches over a long period. It is found in the earliest
plea rolls. Thus in 1194, "a certain woman was murdered (murdrata) at M, and
it is not known who did it." 14 Pipe Roll Society (189i) iii; ef. (1194) I Pal-
grave, Rotuli Curiae Regis, cited supra note 5, at p. 6o. In 1200, S. C. appealed
T. W. that in felony and in the king's peace aznd at night and in murder he killed
J. C. his father, and pulled out his tongue, and upon his face burned a charter of
the king. 2 Palgrave, Rotuli Curiae Regis, cited supra note 5, at p. 245. For a
considerable time after 1340 the word murder continues to be used in the same
sense. (1389) "feloniously slew and murdered," Select Coroners' Rolls, cited
supra note 4, at p. 123; (1392) "feloniously killed and murdered his master," ibid.
48; (1488) "feloniously at L murdered," Y. B. 3 Hen. VII (1487) 5 b, pl. 2;
(152o) "feloniously slew and murdered." Rogers, Oxford City Documents (18
Oxf. Hist. Soc. 1891) 181.
As to the origin of this nurdrum see i Liebermann, op. cit. supra note 3, at p.
642. (Leges Edwardi, 16); Stubbs, Select Charters (gth ed. 1913) 218 (Dial.
de Scacc. I. io) ; Br. f. 134b-I35; 2 Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. supra note 3,
at p. 487. A very good account of Englishry and the rnurdrum is found in Chad-
wyck Healey, Somersetshire Pleas (II Som. Rec. Soc. 1897) 58-62. The form in
which Englishry should be presented varied in the different counties; it was usually
by one, or two, on the side of each parent. Ibid. 77-80 gives the custom for each
county.
8 Originally the fine was 46 marks, Leges Henrici, 91. Cf. Dial. de Scacc. I. io
(Stubbs, op. cit. supra note 7, at p. 219). As to what was actually paid by all the
hundreds in Gloucestershire in 1221, see Maitland, Pleas of the CroZwn for County
of Gloucester (1884) I18. Certain counties were free from the murdrunt, e. g.
Cornwall, Shropshire, Yorkshire. Chadwyck Healey, op. cit. supra note 7, at pp.
77-80. In parts of Worcestershire there was no mturdrum beyond the Severn
(i22). Maitland, op. cit. supra, pl. 1O5. There may be no inurdruin on account
of war, Ibid. pl. 2oo. By ancient custom there was no murder within the covert
COMMENTS
It is consequently not till after 1340 that murder came to mean, in a
special sense, homicide with malice aforethought. Up till then, when
courts gave a judgment of murder, or when lawyer or layman spoke of
murder, what was almost always meant was the murder fine. But this
does not mean that in seeking to find the origin of our modern defini-
tion of murder we may ignore the period before 134o. Really the
problem is two-fold, the idea of the development of malice aforethought
as such, and the connection of that element with homicide in order to
constitute murder. On the side of malice aforethought it carries us
much further back than 1340.
Two writers have already treated this subject of the origin of malice
aforethought in some detail.9 Stephen believed that the historical
answer to the problem was wrapped -up in the writ de odio et atia.10
He also pointed out that the first statutory recognition of malice afore-
thought was to be found in a statute of 1389.11 Maitland believed that
he saw the origin of malice aforethought in the old Anglo-Saxon
forsteal (lying in wait, ambush), which became agwait purpense or
assultus premeditatus in'the medieval English law according to whether
it was translated into French or Latin.1
2
There can be no doubt that Maitland was correct in insisting upon
the intimate historical connection of these three expressions." But
of Malvern Forest. (1221) 1 Select Pleas of the Crown (i Seld. Soc. 1887) 82,
pl. 128. In 1267, after a famine which caused so many deaths that the murder fine
became unbearable, the Statute of Marlborough (1267) 52 Hen. III, c. 25, provided
that the fine was no longer to be levied when a death occurred from misadventure.
'3 Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England (1883) 41 if; Maitland,
The Early History of Malice Aforethought (883) 8 LAw MAG. & Rzv. 4o6,
I Collected Papers (9) 304.
"
0For the writ see 2 Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. supra note 3, at pp. 587-88.
Stephen's theory as to the connection of this writ with the origin of "malice afore-
thought" has not been generally accepted. Ibid. 469, note I. His contention that
the writ was abolished by the Statute of Gloucester (cited supra note 4, c. 9)
can hardly be accepted. 2 Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. 481, note i.
"The statute is found in 3 Rotuli Parliamentorum, 268, or in the statute book
as Stat. 13 Rich. II, st. 2, c. i. See note 33, infra.
"See, for forsteal, I Liebermann, op. cit. supra note 3, II Cnut, 12-15; Leges
Henrici, 8o secs. 2, 4. For agwait purpense, ibid. Leges Wilhelmi, I. 2. For
assultus preineditatus (always in the form in assultu prelneditato) Br. f. 144-
i44b; r Select Pleas of the Crown, cited supra note 8, pls. 88, 94; Select Coroners'
Rolls, passim.
The recently published (London, 1922) first volume of Curia Regis Rolls con-
tains a case from 12oo which still further strengthens the connection. In an appeal
of robbery (p. 179) the appellor counted that the appellee "in felony and in pre-
meditated ambush" (in insidiis premeditatis) assaulted him on the king's highway.
The Latin words italicized are a much closer translation of agwait purpense than
is the usual in assulto premeditato, and the facts as alleged fit the definition of
forsteal as given in Leges Henrici, 8o, sec. 2. Mention of the king's highway in
connection with premeditated assault (as in forsteal) persists, especially in the
coroners' findings. See Select Coroners' Rolls, cited supra note 4, p1s. 18, 21.
See also Br. f. 144, in the appeal of wounds.
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there is difficulty is seeing any direct relation between them and that
malice aforethought which became so essential a part of the murder of
later times. At first sight it might appear that the French purpense
or the Latin premeditatus was sufficient to form the connection, more
especially as the malice prepense (purpense) of the later year books was
the usual expression to denote malice aforethought till at least as late
as Coke's time.' As a matter of fact, however, stress should be put
upon the lying in wait, or the assault, rather than upon the premeditation.
This is certainly true as to forsteal from its very definition, and the
French expression is acknowledged to be but a translation of forsteal;
and the early cases show it is true also in regard to in assultu premedi-
tato.'5 This latter expression occurs not only in cases of homicide,' 6 but
also in cases of robbery,17 mayhem,18 wounding,' 9 and mere assault."0
In the time of the earliest plea rolls its use seems to have been confined
to instances of actual premeditated assault or attack; it is invariably
used to express a state of fact. The great majority of appeals of
felony in which it occurs also contain an allegation of robbery; many
of them are out and out cases of robbery. It is significant, too, that a
rather exhaustive search of all the early printed material has failed to
disclose a single case of homicide in which premeditated assault is
alleged, which is not also a case of robbery, or wounding resulting from
a planned attack.2' Bracton in giving the words of the appeal of homi-
cide includes therein the in assultu premeditato; but he inserts the same
expression also in the appeal of wounding and of mayhem.2 2 For the
generation or two following Bracton the coroners' rolls reveal the
same general situation.
2
", Coke uses it in commenting on his definition of murder. 3 Coke, Institutes
(ed. 1797) 50.
"See supra notes 12 and 23. Some of the cases omit the premeditato. I Curia
Regis Rolls, 39, 63. The allegation of ambush continues for a long time. Thus
as late as 1481, in an appeal brought by a woman for the death of her husband,
she counted that defendant lay in wait (gisoit en agait) to murder her husband,
Y. B. 21 Ed. IV, 25, pl. 17.
(194) I Palgrave, Rotuli Curiae Regis, 6o.
1? (i2o3) i Select Pleas of the Crown, cited supra note 8, pl. 88; (12o6)
ibid. pl. 94.
's (1225) 3 Bracton's Note Book (Maitland ed. 1887) p1.,I084; (1266) Select
Coroners' Rolls, cited supra note 4, at p. 2.
(12oo) I Curia Regis Rolls, supra note 13, at pp. 209, 246.
' (i22i) i Select Pleas of the Crown, supra note 8, pl. 164, "G. with his
force came and intruded into his house against him, and wickedly and in felony
and in premeditated assault, assaulted and beat and ill-treated him."
"Of the many appeals of homicide, in (1201-1225) I Select Pleas of the Crown,
cited supra note 8, only one, pl. 121, alleges premeditated assault, and then in con-
nection with the wounding from which death resulted considerably later--"they
came out of a mill irn which they had lain concealed, and in premeditated assault
came upon W. and wounded him."
Br. f. 138, f. 144, f. i44b; cf. Fleta, 48, 59.
"Select Coroners' Rolls, passim.
COMMENTS
All our available evidence points to the same conclusion. The charge
of premeditated assault occurs not only in cases of homicide, but also
in other crimes of violence, and in cases of slaying only where -there is
the actual premeditated attack. These crimes were all felonies, and
were among the so-called pleas of the crown in which the complainant
had specifically to allege felony and breach of the king's peace.2 1 While
it was not necessary to allege premeditated assault, in many cases where
the facts would admit of it the appellor, to further strengthen his charge
it would seem, did allege it; in doing which he was making-more or
less unconsciously we may suppose-a charge of forsteal which had
been one of the earliest of the pleas of the crown.2 5 Thus we get the
in assultu premeditato of the Latin records. Applied to crimes of
violence generally under the proper states of fact, it existed as a part
of the complaint long before any consideration of malice was either
necessary or possible, and it continued so to exist, independently of
allegations of malice, long after the question of malice became all
important.
26
We must look for the origin of malice aforethought in quite another
field. Even in the days when liability was so nearly absolute that the
courts would pronounce against the one who killed by mischance or in
self-defence the same judgment that would be rendered against the most
wanton slayer, there was one place in which the question of intent in
connection with homicide came to be consideredY.2  The only way in
which the strict letter of the law could be mitigated for those who
"The fullest treatment of the pleas of the crown for this period will be found
in Bracton, f. I5b-159. For actual cases see i Select Pleas of the Crown (i Seld.
Soc.). For examples from the period of the year books see Fitzherbert, Abridg-
ment (circa 1514) tit. Corone, or Broke, Adbridgement (568) tit. Corone.
Standard works are Staunford, Plees del Coron (1557) ; Hale, Pleas of the Crown
(763). We get our first view of pleas of the crown from the time of Cnut;
they are only five in number, but they include breach of the king's special peace
and forsteal. See 2 Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. supra note 3, at p. 453.
'Maitland says that the man alleged to be guilty of premeditated assault, is
"'charged with forsteal, agwait purpense, guet-apens." I Collected Papers (19i1)
318.
The element represented in forsteal continues to be alleged in cases of violent
slaying. (1390) "X and Y lying in wait feloniously killed W. J." Select Cor-
oners' Rolls, cited supra note 4, io9-IiO. The lying in wait or the assault are dis-
tinguished from the malice aforethought, as in the statute of 1389 referred to
above (and supra note 1i) ; so also in 1469 "if a man be indicted that he of
malice aforethought and assault killed a man." Y. B. 9 Ed. IV (1469) 26 pl. 35.
Even after Thomas Buckler's Case (supra note 2) has made the meaning of
murder very definite, the old forms will still persist though only verbiage. Thus
from 1567 we get "murder by lying in wait, assault, and malice prepense and
aforethought." Turner v. Musgrave (K.B.) 3 Dyer (ed. 1794) 261.
'As to killing by misadventure and in self-defence in the earlier law, see 2
Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. supra note 3, at pp. 483-84.
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had innocently slain another was through a royal pardon.", Before the
middle of the thirteenth century it had become a recognized practice for
such slayers under judgment of death or outlawry-which entailed also
loss of lands and chattels-to pray a pardon of the king. The records
of many of these pardons are yet extant. Their language makes it clear
that the king, before exercising his prerogative power, would insist upon
being assured of the lack of moral guilt on the part of the slayer. On
this point he was informed by a jury specially called to determine the
matter. In the findings of these juries as given in the pardons we get
our earliest use of the expression "malice aforethought." 29  By 1230 at
the latest the pardons are making use of that expression in the sense
in which it came to be used at a later time.2 0 By far the larger number
of early pardons are concerned with cases of misadventure; generally
they will recite that A killed B "by misadventure and not by felony and
malice aforethought,"3' 1 though felony will not be mentioned in some
of them. 2
Unlike "in assultu premeditato" in appeals of felony, the reference
to malice aforethought apparently never occurs in the earlier pardons
except in cases of homicide; but in that connection it becomes so fixed,
that in the official register of writs, which comes to be printed in 1687,
the writs of pardon for excusable killings will still say, "by misadventure
(in self-defence) and not by felony or malice aforethought.""2
'2 This was strictly a use of the prerogative power of the king, not a matter of
law. "The king moved by pity pardoned him the death." (1212) I Select Pleas
of the Crown, cited supra note 8, pl. I14; "The king by his grace and not by
judgment has granted him pardon for that death." (1236) Bracton's Note Book,
supra note 18, pl. 1216. Even the Statute of Gloucester (cited supra note 4)
made no further provision for the slayer who killed in self-defence or by mischance
than that "the king shall take him to his grace if it pleases him." See 3 Holds-
worth, op. cit. supra note 4, 257-58.
1 We cannot here go into the question as to why this matter of intent should be
taken into consideration by these special inquests at a time when it was still being
ignored by the courts. It may have been due to ecclesiastical influence. See 2
Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. supra note 3, at p. 476. The substantial pecuniary
consideration which accompanied the prayer for a pardon presumably had at least
as much to do with the granting of pardons for innocent killing as any high motive
on the king's part.
'o (i23o) Patent Rolls, 14 Hen. III, 393. The writ, addressed to all the king's
bailiffs, reads: "Because-by an inquest which we caused to be made to determine
whether R. P. killed B. P. knowingly and deliberately and with malice aforethought,
or unwittingly and by misadventure-we have learned that he did not do this
knowingly and willingly, but unwillingly and by misadventure ... 
31 (1243) I R61es Gascons, no. 911; ibad. no. 973.
(1254) I R61es Gascons, no. 3983; (1231) Patent Rolls, 16 Hen. I1, 456.
We have found no references to self-defence, as contrasted with misadventure, in
the earliest pardons; seemingly self-defence is made a ground of pardon somewhat
later than misadventure. An interesting pardon of Edward I for slaying in self-
defence, "and not feloniously or of malice aforethought," will be found in (1313)
i Y. B. 6 and 7 Edw. II (24 Sel. Soc. 1909) 139.
"Registrum Brevium Originalium, ff. 287, 309. It is interesting to note in this
connection that the act of 1389 (supra note ii), which seemed so important to both
Stephen and Maitland, is concerned solely with pardons.
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For a long time the charters of pardon alone make mention of malice
aforethought.84 Many such pardons were granted, with the result that
the meaning and connotation of malice became familiar. So we are
not surprised when in i27o, after a brawl in which a person is wounded,
we see the offending party made to swear, with fifty compurgators, that
the affair had been the result of sudden anger and not of malice afore-
thought. 8 In i3o6, in a local (hundred) court, a plaintiff alleges that
defendant uttered a slander with malice aforethought.8 " From the
cases of 1330 we have three instances of homicide where the jurors say
that the killing was done in self-defence, and not by felony and malice
aforethought.3 7  Later, in 1356, a coroner's jury say on their oath that,
"Thomas met the said Maud, and with malice aforethought took her
staff from her hand and struck her many blows, so that she fell to the
ground and raised the hue and cry against the said Thomas."38  In
1389 the jurors of two townships present that A went to the house of B
and by reason of an ancient grudge, premeditating the said B's death
(pro antiqua ira precogitando nortem) struck him with a sword and
caused his death. 9 Two years later a coroner's jury say that A and B
with malice aforethought lay in wait (ex maicia precogitata incidi-
averunt) for X at N and there feloniously murdered (murdraverunt)
and killed him.40  This case is important. It is the first instance that has
been found of malice aforethought being applied to the lying in wait,
the old forsteal in which Maitland would find the origin of this element.
Yet for over one hundred and fifty years the pardons have consistently
been applying the test of malice aforethought to distinguish killing by
mischance from killing with intent to kill. Notice also the use of
lnurdraverunt in the old sense.41  Two points are clear from this case,
From the evidence of the printed material it would seem to be about forty
years, considerably more than a medieval generation.
" "Non ex praecogitata malitia . . . . sed ex motu iracundiae nimis accensae."
T. Wykes, IV Annales Monastici (Rolls Series) 234-35. This was eight years
before the statute of Gloucester, supra note 4, reformed the procedure in regard to
cases of excusable homicide looking toward pardons.
W2 Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. supra note 3, at p. 538, note 5 (citing an
unprinted court roll).
"Fitzherbert, Corone, cited supra note 24, pls. 284, 286, 287. The language as
to malice is that of the pardons of one hundred years earlier. The prisoners were
remitted to prison to await the king's grace, i. e. pardon.
I Select Coroners' Rolls, op. cit. supra note 4, at p. 102. Should the part played
by the jury in extending the idea of "malice aforethought" be emphasized? We
have as yet had no case of an appeal of felony in which the expression is used,
but we have seen three types of jury making use of it-the jury to whom the king
before granting a pardon put the question of misadventure (supra note 30), the
jury that tries the indicted person (supra note 37), and the coroner's jury.
" Select Coroners' Rolls, cited supra note 4, at p. ioo. This is a clear case of
an expression of malice aforethought in connection with killing, though not in the
usual words.
Select Coroners' Rolls, cited supra note 4, 124.
"Supra note 6.
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that murder has not yet come to mean only and always killing with
malice aforethought, and also that the allegation of such malice may be
coupled with the ambush as an act by itself.42  In 1403-04, in response
to a prayer of the commons that malefactors who tear out both eyes or
cut off the tongue be held for felony, the king replied that he granted
the prayer, provided it be found that the deed was done par malice pur-
pense."3 That is, at the beginning of the fifteenth century the presence
of malice aforethought is the fact which determines that certain acts of
violence, which stop short of homicide, are felonies. Just before the
middle of that century we find a case in point with a decidedly modern
flavor. In i44o a servant is said to have killed his former master, after
leaving his service, because of malice aforethought engendered while he
was yet in that service.44  Within the generation which followed, it
seems to have become the custom to indict a man for murder with
malice aforethought. Such certainly appears to have been the practice
referred to in a case from 1469, which informs us that if a man be
indicted that he of malice aforethought and assault killed a man, his
charter of pardon will not be allowed by the court unless it expressly
makes mention of murder.4 5
But ii is not necessary to proceed further with the cases. Before the
fifteenth century is out we get the first of a series of statutes, which,
passed for the purpose of making murder an offense without benefit of
clergy, so emphasize the element of malice aforethought that its relation
to the crime is made perfectly dear. 8
CONSTRUCTIVE CONTEMPT IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
The power of the courts summarily to punish their critics, curbing as
it does the liberty of the press and freedom of speech, has been fruitful
of controversy. Contempt of court by a publication tending to obstruct
the administration of justice in a pending proceeding' is in the natfire
of a criminal act, and when committed out of the presence of the court,
is classed as "constructive" contempt.2 But after the final disposition of
Cf. the charge of malice in cases noted above-wounds, supra note 35; slander,
supra note 36; beating, supra note 38.
"3 Rotuli Parlamentorum, 541.
"Y. B. ig Hen. VI (1431) 47, Pl. 102.
"Y. B. 9 Edw. IV (1469) 26, Pl. 35.
(1496) 12 Hen. VII, c. 7; (1512) 4 Hen. VIII, c. 2; (1531) 23 Hen. VIII,
c. i, secs. 3, 4; (1547) I Edw. VI, c. 12, sec. 1o. See 3 Stephen, op. cit. supra
note 9, at p. 44.
1 Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States (igi8) 247 U. S. 402, 38 Sup. Ct 560;
Patterson v. Colorado (197o) 2o5 U. S. 454, 27 Sup. Ct 556; Rapalje, Contempts
(1884) sec. 56; I Bailey, Habeas Corpus (1913) see. 63; 3 Ann. Cas. 763, note.
'Contempts of court are classified according to their character as civil and crimi-
nal; according to the place in which they occur as direct and constructive. Civil
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a case, the press and public may freely criticize the decisions of the
court.' Prior to the eighteenth century, a libel on a court by one other
than an officer of the law was punished only after the usual trial by
jury.-' In a case decided in 1765, based upon a misconception of earlier
decisions, such an offense was held to be punishable in a summary
proceeding.5 Subsequent cases propagated the error and it is now said,
almost universally, that the power so to punish even constructive con-
tempt inheres in all courts of record. 6 Since the lower federal courts are
creatures of Congress, however, their powers are subject to limitation
by legislative enactment.7  In 1831 Congress passed an act declaratory
of the law concerning contempt of court," which provides that, "The
said courts [of the United States] shall have the power to punish by
fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of the court, contempts of their
authority. PROViDED that such power to punish contempts shall not
be construed to extend to any cases except the misbehavior of any
person in their presence, or so near thereto as to obstruct the admimis-
tration of justice. . . ." The question of the legislative intent in
passing the act has often been in issue.
In the much-discussed case of Craig v. Hecht (1923, U. S.) 44 Sup.
Ct. 103, an information was filed against the petitioner, comptroller of
the City of New York, charging him with contempt of court. It was
alleged that the petitioner had published a letter in which he falsely
asserted that the district judge had adopted the policy of denying public
officials access to the original sources of information concerning the
contempt consists of a failure to carry out an order of the court issued in a civil
suit for the benefit of the opposing party; suit is brought in the name of the party
and the ultimate object is remedial. Criminal contempt is an act committed against
the majesty of the court as an agency of the government; suit is brought in the
name of the state to punish the offender. Direct contempt is an insult to the court
or resistance of its authority committed in its presence. Constructive contempt is
an act done not in the presence of the court, but at a distance, which tends to
obstruct the administration of justice. Beale, Contempt of Court, Criminal and
Civil (i9o8) 21 HAgv. L. Rv.. 161; Palmer, Constructive Contempt (1916) 50
Am. L. REv. 368; see Gompers v. United States (1914) 233 U. S. 604, 34 Sup.
Ct. 693; Ann. Cas. 1915 D, io48, note; (1923) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 843.
' See Patterson v. Colorado, supra note i, at p. 463, 27 Sup,, Ct. at p. 558.
' See an exhaustive treatment by Fox, The King v. Almnon (i9o8) 24 L. QuART.
REv. 184, 266; 3 Holdsworth, A History of English Law (3d ed. 1923) 391-394.
'Rex v. Alnon (1765, K. B.) Wilmot's Notes, 243; Fox, The Summary Process
to Punish Contempt (19o9) 25 L. QuART. Rzv. 238.
'Hollingsworth v. Duane (18oi, C. C. Pa.) Fed. Cas. No. 6,616; State v. Frew
(1884) 24 W. Va. 416, 457; I Bailey, supra note i, secs. 64, 65.
lEx parte Robinson (1873, U. S.) 19 Wall. 5o5. The court expressed opinion,
no doubt correct, that the powers of the constitutionally created Supreme Court
are not subject to restriction by Congress. See United States v. Shipp (19o6) 203
U. S. 563, 27 Sup. Ct 165; In re Perkins (I9OO, E. D. N. C.) ioo Fed. 95o.
'Act of March 2, 1831, U. S. Rev. Sts. 1878, sec. 725 at p. 137, rewritten into
the Act of March 3, 1911 (36 Stat. at L. 1163).
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affairs of public utility corporations in bankruptcy proceedings pending
in the district court. The letter was published following a decision by the
judge against the appointment of the petitioner as co-receiver in bank-
ruptcy.9 A demurrer to the information was overruled by the district
judge and, after a hearing, the petitioner was sentenced for contempt.
He immediately sought habeas corpus from a circuit judge who, exercis-
ing the power of a district court, granted the writ. The Supreme
Court, affirming the circuit court of appeals, held that the granting of
habeas corpus was error since the district court had acted within its
jurisdiction.' 0 Justices Holmes and Brandeis dissented.
The case fell within the general rule that in a proceeding of habeas
corpus only jurisdictional questions, and not errors in the decision, are
subject to review." The effect of the Act of 1831 was thus in issue.
From the historical setting of the statute, an inference may be drawn,
by no means conclusive, that Congress intended to declare the common
law.' 2 However, the language used, "except misbehavior . . . . in
their presence, or so near thereto as to obstruct" strongly implies a
limitaiola. - But whatever the legislative intendment, the legal effect of
the enactment must be as subsequent judicial decisions have defined it.
The first case in which the statute was launched upon a sinuous course
through the courts held that the judges were "disarmed" of their power
The view has been expressed, that since the court had rendered its decision on
the appointment of a co-recei'er, the letter related to a past decision and so was
not an act of contempt. E- parte Craig (1921, C. J. 2d) 274 Fed. 177, 187;
Ex parte Craig (1922, C. C. A. 2d) 282 Fed. 138, 159.
10 The lower court decisions appear in United States v. Craig (1920, S. D. N. Y.)
266 Fed. 230; Ex parte Craig (1921, C. J. 2d) 274 Fed. 177; United States
v. Craig (1921, S. D. N. Y.) 279 Fed. 900; Ex parte Craig (1922, C. C. A. 2d)
282 Fed. 1-38."
11Glasgow v. Moyer (1912) 225 U. S. 420, 32 Sup. Ct. 753; 1 Bailey, op. cit.
supra note I, see. 7,; see also Jenks, The Story of the Habeas Corpus (19o2) 18
L. QuART. REv. 64. It has been argued, however, that- the Craig case should be
treated as an exception to this rule since the petitioner was the chief financial officer
of a large city, and his absence from duty was a matter of public concern. 'See
dissenting opinion of Justice Hand in Ex parte Craig (1922, C. C. A. 2d) 282 Fed.
138, I58.
1 The Act of 1831 was passed after the impeachment and acquittal in Congress
of Judge Peck who had summarily punished an editor for publishing an article
referring to a case that had terminated. 7 Gale's and Seaton's Register of Debates
in Congress (183o-1) 42. After the acquittal of Judge Peck it was resolved that
the committee on the Judiciary be directed to inquire into the expediency of defin-
ing by statute all offenses which might be punished as contempt by the courts. Mr.
Draper, introducing the resolution, indicated a desire to find out the law rather
than to change it; he said, ". . . . we shall have no difficulty in defining what
are not contempts . . . . the law ought to be so clear that every individual may be
able to look to the statute book, and know whether, in anything that he may do
he acts within the law or not." 7 Gale's and Seaton's, op. cit. 56o-56i. Mr.
Buchanan, one of the prosecutors of Judge Peck, framed the act and it was passed
without debate.
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summarily to punish libels upon parties to the suit"3  "So near thereto
as to obstruct" was deemed to impose a spatial rather than a causal
curtailment; an act was no longer contempt unless committed in the
presence or proximity of the court.' 4 This interpretation was kept
alive by numerous dicta in subsequent cases.' 5 But hard cases involving
other sorts of constructive contempt arose, and the courts reacted from
a construction imposing so narrow a limitation. Tampering with wit-
ness or juror in the hallway of the courthouse," on the street within its
vicinity 7 or even in the same city:' was held to be contempt within the
statute. An assault upon a judicial officer,'9 the service of summons
upon a privileged witness 20 and the preparation of false affidavits,2 '
all at a distance from the court, were summarily dealt with. In such
cases the criterion was said to be the direct tendency of an act to obstruct
the administration of justice and not its physical propinquity to the
court.
22
It seems still to have been thought, no doubt because of the circum-
stances which occasioned the passage of the act, that a newspaper criti-
cism was immune.23  However, when the question was presented to
the Supreme Court in the Toledo Newspaper case,' 4 continuous attacks
'Ex parte Poulson (1835, C. C. E. D. Pa.) Fed. Cas. No. 11,350.
""The court said in Ex parte Poulson, supra note 13, at p. 12o8, "Disorder may
be repressed in their presence on hearing in a summary manner, but after an
adjournment, no attachment can be issued for anything done out of court during
the intermission of its actual session."
"Ex parte Bradley (1868, U. S.) 7 Wall. 364, 372; Ex parte Robinson, supra
note 7, at p. 511; In re May (i88o, E. D. Mich.) i Fed. 737, 743; Ex parte
Schulenburg (1885, C. C. E. D. Mich.) 25 Fed. 2y1, 213; Morse v. Montana
Oregon Purchasing Co. (ioo, C. C. D. Mont.) 105 Fed. 337, 347. In Hillmn v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1897, C. C. xst Div. Kan.) 79 Fed. 749, the writing of a
letter out of court was held not to be punishable as contempt.
"' Ex parte Savin (1889) 131 U. S. 267, 9 Sup. Ct. 699.
'In re Brule (1895, D. Nev.) 71 Fed. 943; United States v. Carrol (19o6, D.
Mont.) 147 Fed. 947. But the taking of a deposition in another state in order to
impose a fraud upon the court is not so "near thereto as to obstruct." Doniphan v.
Lehman (I9O2, C. C. D. Ind.) 179 Fed. 173.
I Kirk v. United States (1911, C. C. A. 9th) 192 Fed. 273; McCaully v. United
States (I9O5) 25 App. D. C. 404.
"Ex parte McLeod (19o3, N. D. Ala.) 12o Fed. 130.
"United States v. Zavelo (191o, C. C. N. D. Ala.) 177 Fed. 536.
"See In re Steiner (1912, S. D. N. Y.) 195 Fed. 299. But a misstatement
of the effect of a decision is not contempt within the statute. Asbestos Co. v. John
Manville Co. (1911, C. C. S. D. N. Y.) 189 Fed. 611.
' See United States v. Anonymous (1884, C. C. W. D. Tenn.) 21 Fed. 761, 769;
United States v. Huff (1913, S. D. Ga.) 206 Fed. 700, 705 (letter to the judge
while case was pending).
"In Cuyler v. Atlantic & N. C. R. R. (19o4, C. C. E. D.. N. C.) 131 Fed. 95,
under facts very similar to the Craig case the petitioner was discharged on habeas
corpus. See also Kirk v. United States, supra note 18, at p. 277; Ex parte McLeod,
supra note ig, at p. 137.
24 Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, supra note i, at p. 419, 38 Sup. Ct
at p. 564. The court said, "The test, therefore, is the character of the act done
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upon a district judge, published in the same city in which he was sitting,
tending to provoke public resistance to an order of the court and attempt-
ing to influence the judge in deciding the matter before him, were held
(Holmes and Brandeis dissenting) to constitute contempt. Chief
Justice White, in delivering the opinion, said of the statute in question
that "the provision conferred no power not already granted, and imposed
no limitation not already existing." Since the Craig case was raised
on habeas corpus, the court was not called upon to decide whether the
conduct constituted contempt.25 However if conduct is plainly such
that no right-minded judge could regard it as contempt, then the lower
court is deemed to have acted "in excess of its powers" and habeas
corpus will lie.26 In the opinion of the minority the facts of the Craig
case fell within the latter category.27
The variance of opinion is due, in part, to variance in the convictions
of the individual judge as to what is socially expedient.2 8  Criticism of
and its direct tendency to prevent and obstruct the discharge of judicial duty."
Strong dicta to the same effect appear in In re Independent Publishing Co. (1917,
C. C. A. 9th) 24o Fed. 849 (the jury, having read the newspaper comments, was
discharged) 'and in United States v. Providence Tribune Co. (1917, D. R. I.) 241
Fed. 524 (publications disclosing secret investigations of grand jury).
'It has often been said, however, that this question is jurisdictional. In re
Wood (18go) 82 Mich. 75, 45 N. W. 1113; Bailey, op. cit. supra note I, at p. 27o;
Talbert, Contempt Proceedings and Habeas Corpus (1912) 46 Am. L. Rav. 838,
851. In Ex parte Savn, supra note 16, and Ex parte Cuddy (1889) 131 U. S. 28o,
9 Sup. Ct. 703, the facts were examined, although the writ was denied on the
ground that the conduct of the petitioner did, in law, constitute contempt.
'In Ex parte Hudgins (1919) 249 U. S. 378, 39 Sup. Ct. 337, the petitioner was
discharged where the alleged misconduct for which he was committed constituted
an act of perjury, and not of contempt See (1918) 28 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 826.
And in Elliott v. United States (1904) 23 App. D. C. 456, a writ of habeas corpus
was granted to one who was sentenced for refusing to testify concerning a com-
munication that was privileged after the court examined the record and passed on
the question of privilege. In Ex parte Ayres (1887) 123 U. S. 443, 8 Sup. Ct. 164,
inquiry was made as to whether the lower court had authority to issue the order,
disobedience of which was the alleged act of contempt.
'The dissenting opinion reasons, with the characteristic forcefulness of Justice
Holmes, that the statute limits the jurisdiction of the judge "to cases where his
personal action is necessary to enable him to go. on with his work," that here there
was no matter pending to make this sort of contempt possible, and even if there
had been, the acts committed could not possibly obstruct the administration of
justice. And in the dissenting opinion in the Toledo Newspaper case, supra note I,
at p. 424, 38 Sup. Ct at p. 565, it is said: "A judge of the United States is
expected to be a man of ordinary firmness of character, and I find it impossible
to believe that such a judge could have found in anything that was printed even a
tendency to prevent his performing his sworn duty." Judge Manton, in Ex parte
Craig (1921) 274 Fed. 177, at p. -86, said to the same effect, "By no interpretation
can the letter be said to have any 'tendency to embarrass or influence the
c o u r t . . . "
' Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921) 71; Pound, "Courts and
Legislation," 9 Modern Legal Philosophy Series (1917) 223.
COMMENTS
a pending proceeding is conceived to obstruct the administration of
justice either by belittling the court in the eyes of the populace or by
creating an atmosphere of prejudice inimical to impartial decision.29
Ought not the power to punish by summary proceedings, in which the
court acts as prosecutor, judge and jury, be confined to acts which
present an immediate obstruction? In both the Toledo Newspaper case
and the Craig case the summary proceedings were instituted after a
final decision, presumedly impartial, had been rendered. The efficacy
of such action as a means of vindicating the dignity of a court may well
be questioned. If the purpose be to prevent repetition in future cases it
is purely penal in character, and in conformity to a deep-rooted principle
in our law, the accused ought to be accorded a trial by jury. 0 The judge
has his remedy in an action of libel for damages."- It is urged that
the power of the courts to inflict summary punishment is "an indis-
pensable means of self-preservation.""2 The president performs execu-
tive functions without it. Congress cannot commit those who criticize
its actions while in session.3 The Interstate Commerce Commission3 4
and the subordinate tribunals3 5 survive without the power to inflict
summary punishment. And the Probate Courts may punish only the
limited number of acts enumerated in enabling statutes.3 6 An objection
to which Chief Justice Taft is sensible s7 is the "delicacy in a judge's
deciding whether an attack upon his own judicial action is mere criticism
or real obstruction, and the possibility that impulse may incline his view
to personal vindication. . . ." A similar delicacy exists in the reluctance
of a reviewing court, unconsciously sympathetic, to reverse a commit-
ment, and so disparage the dignity which the lower court sought to
defend.
THE WIFE'S INTEREST IN COMMUNITY PROPERTY
The doctrine of community property' was inherited by some of our
southwestern states from the civil law, but in others it is an exotic
Bailey, op. cit. supra note x, sec. 63.
The Act of Oct. I5, 1914 (38 Stat at L. 738, 739) provides that the accused
may in all cases not covered by the Act of 1831, demand a trial by jury.
See People v. Gilbert (1917) 281 Ill. 61g, 628, 118 N. Y. 1g6, i99.
' Bailey, loc. cit. supra note 29; In re Chadwick (1896) lO9 Mich. 588, 67 N. W.
1071.
'Marshall v. Gordon (1917) 243 U. S. 521, 37 Sup. Ct 448 (one committed by
the House for publishing defamatory and insulting letters released on habeas
corpus).
"Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson (1894) 154 U. S. 447, 14 Sup.
Ct. 1125.
" United States v. Beavers (903, S. D. N. Y.) 125 Fed. 778.
" Rapalie, op. cit. supra note I, sec. 5; In re Merrill (1917) 88 N. J. Eq. 261,
lO2 Atl. 400.
", Craig v. Hecht, 44 Sup. Ct at p. 107.
"In general, statutes define the separate property of the husband or wife as
YALE LAW JOURNAL
introduced by statute.', It now exists in eight states,' and is every-
where governed by statute. Probably no one of the states still follows
the civil law as to the wife's interest.4
The interests of the husband and the wife in the community property
during the marriage have been described variously by the courts. In
California it is said that the wife's interest is an expectancy and the
husband is the sole owner ;5 in Louisiana that the wife has an inchoate
right only0 and the husband owns the property ;" but in Texas that the
beneficial interests of the husband and wife are equal,8 and in Washing-
ton that the proprietary interests of the husband and wife are equal and
unified.9 In the other four states the courts say that the wife's interest
during marriage is not an expectancy but a present vested interest equal
to that of her husband.' 0
all property owned by him or her before marriage and that acquired afterwards
by gift, bequest, devise or descent, with the rents, issues and profits thereof.
Community property is all other property acquired after marriage by either
husband or wife. Estates by curtesy and in dower are inconsistent with the
community property system, and in some states are expressly prohibited. Idaho
Comp. Sts. i9ig, ch. 184, sec..4668.
2
"The law of community property seems to have originated among the early
German tribes (being known as the law of Gananciales), being unwritten and
brought into Spain by the Visigoths, and first reduced to writing in the Code
of Euric or Tolosa (466-484 A. D.). It became the law of Mexico with the
coming of the Spaniards in 1521, and the following years, and after the treaty
of Guadalupe Hidalgo, inherited as the law of California, with such changes
as were deemed advisable." Nixon v. Brown (1923, Nev.) 214 Pac. 524, 527.
See also Packard v. Arellanes (1861) I7 Calif. 525; Guice v. Lawrence (1847)
2 La. Ann. 226; Reade v. De Lea (i9o8) 14 N. M. 442, 95 Pac. I31. It is a
foreign introduction in Idaho and Washington. See McKay, Community Prop-
erty (1910) 37.
'The community property system is found in Arizona, California, Idaho,
Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas and Washington.
"The rule of the Spanish law on that subject, [the wife's interest during
marriage] is laid down by Febrero with his usual precision: The ownership
of the wife, says that author, is revocable and fictitious during marriage. As
long as the husband lives and the marriage is not dissolved, the wife must not
say that she has gananciales, nor is she to prevent the husband from using them,
under the pretext that the law gives her one-half. But, soluto matrimonio, she
becomes irrevocably the owner of one undivided half, in the manner provided
by law for ordinary joint ownership." Guice v. Lawrence, supra note 2, at p. 228.
'Packard v. Arellanes, supra note 2; contra: Beard v. Knox (0855) 5 Calif.
252.
'Succession of Boyer (i884) 36 La. Ann. 5o6, overruling Dixon v. Dixon
(1832) 4 La. 188.
"Peck v. Board of Directors (915) 137 La. 334, 68 So. 629.
'Burnhain v. Hardy Oil Co. (917) io8 Tex. 555, 195 S. W. 1139.
'"In it, [legal community] the proprietary interests of husband and wife
are equal, and those interests d6 not seem to be united merely, but unified; not
mixed or blent but identified . . . ." Holyoke v. Jackson (1882) 3 Wash. T.
235, 239, 3 Pac. 84r, 842. See Marston v. Rue (i916) 92 Wash. 129, 159 Pac. iii.
"La Tourette v. La Tourette (1914) 15 Ariz. 20o, 137 Pac. 426; Ewald v.
Hufton (1918) 31 Idaho, 373, 173 Pac. 247; Peterson v. Peterson (922) 35
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In determining the rights of the parties each state court has, more
or less consistently, followed a theory of its own as to the nature of
the institution;"' but since in some instances the terms of the statutes
of these jurisdictions are not wholly consistent with the theories of
their courts, the significance of the judicial descriptions of the wife's
interest and the theory followed is somewhat uncertain. It seems more
important to scrutinize the particular statutes and the broad or narrow
interpretation given them by the courts. For example, according to the
California theory of sole ownership in the husband, he should be able
to convey the community real estate alone, to make a gift of the personal
property without his wife's consent, and an inheritance tax should be
charged on the half of the 'community property which the wife takes
on the death of her husband; but all of these seem to be forbidden by
the terms of the statutes.12 Under the Washington theory of equal
proprietary interests a conveyance of the community realty by the
husband to a bona fide purchaser should not pass the wife's interest;
yet by statute such a transfer by the one having the record title passes
a good title. 3
The development of the community property system in California
has been somewhat different from that in the other states, as is clearly
shown in the recent case of Roberts v. Wehmeyer (1923, Calif.) 218
Pac. 22; and without doubt the wife is less advantageously treated in
that state. The absence of a statute allowing the wife a testamentary
disposition of half of the community property"' and the narrow con-
struction given to existing statutes are responsible for this. Thus it
is said that a gift of the community property by the husband is not
Idaho, 470, 207 Pac. 425, overruling Hall v. Johns (igog) 17 Idaho, 224, 105
Pac. 71; It re Williams' Estate (1916) 40 Nev. 241, 16I Pac. 741; Nixon v.
Brown, supra note 2; Beals v. Ares (igig) 25 N. M. 459, 185 Pac. 780, over-
ruling Reade v. De Lea, supra note 2.
' Professor Evans has shown that there are four theories regarding the nature
of the ownership of community property. He has called these the California
or single ownership theory, the Idaho or double ownership theory (including in
this Arizona, Nevada and New Mexico), the Texas or trust theory (probably
including Louisiana), and the Washington or entity theory. Evans, The Owner-
ship of Community Property (92) 35 HARv. L. REv. 47.
" Calif. Sts. 1917, ch. 583, sec. 2 (wife required to join in a conveyance of
the community realty); ibid. sec. i (husband forbidden to make a gift of
community personal property without consent of the wife) ; ibid. ch. 589, sec. I
(inheritance tax law not to apply to the half of the community property taken
by wife on death of husband). Prior to this statute the surviving wife's
share of the community property was subject to an inheritance tax. In re
Moffitt's Estate (I9O8) 153 Calif. 359, 95 Pac. 653.
'Wash. Comp. Sts. 1922, sec. 10577. See infra note 24.
'* In I919 in California a law giving the wife the same right as the husband to
dispose of her one-half of the community property by will, was passed by the
Legislature, signed by the Governor and then upon a referendum was defeated
at the polls on November 2, 19i20 See Reiter, Community Property as Between
Husband and Wife (1922) ig OHIO L. BULL. (xi. s.) 669.
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void but vests the property in the donee subject only to the wife's power
to revoke the gift and have it reinstated as community property under
the control of the husband ;'- that during the marriage the wife cannot
maintain an action based on fraud to set aside a sale or mortgage of
-the community property by the husband;16 and in addition that the
husband has such a vested interest in the community property that he
cannot be deprived of it without due process of law, so that a statute
limiting, even to the extent indicated above, the husband's power to
give away the community property without the wife's consent17 has
been held not to apply to community property acquired before its
enactment.' In the instant case the court held that a statute requiring
the wife to join in a deed of community realty 9 did not apply to com-
munity property acquired before the statute.
In general, modern statutes give the wife more and more power over
the community property. Except in Louisiana,20 she must join in a
conveyance of the realty,2' though in Texas22 and Nevada23 this is only
"Spreckels v. Spreckels (1916) 172 Calif. 775, 158 Pac. 537. It seems that
the power of revocation is of little use to the wife, since the husband might
immediately give the property away again. See also Dahne v. Dahne (1920)
49 Calif. App. 5O, 193 Pac. 785. In Washington, consistently with their theory
of the wife's interest, the courts allowed the wife to recover during marriage a
gift made by the husband without her consent. Marston v. Rue, supra note 9.
"Johnson v. Johnson (1917) 33 Calif. App. 93, 164 Pac. 421. The decisions
to this effect are before the requirement that the wife join in a conveyance of
the community real property but after the wife's written consent to such a con-
veyance was required. Likewise in Louisiana the wife cannot maintain an action
during marriage, and her relief for a fraudulent alienation by the husband is
by an action against the heirs of the husband to recover her share. Tourne v.
His Creditors (1834) 6 La. 459; Tourne v. Tourne (1836) 9 La. 452. "But if
it should be proved that the husband has sold the common property, or other-
wise disposed of the same by fraud, to injure his wife, she may have her
action against the heirs of her husband, in support of her claim in one-half of
the property, on her satisfactorily proving the fraud." La. Rev. Civ. Code,
1912, art. 24o4.
'Calif. Sts. 1917, ch. 583, sec. I.,
"Spreckels v. Spreckels (1897) I16 Calif. 339, 48 Pac. 228; Jacobs v. All
Persons (191o) 12 Calif. App. 163, io6 Pac. 896. In accord is Reade v. De Lea,
supra note 2, but in the theory and reasoning used this case is not in line with
most of the New Mexico cases. But see Scott v. Scott (1914, Tex. Civ. App.)
170 S. W. 273 (statute taking from husband and giving to wife the control and
disposition of her personal earnings held not to impair any vested right of the
husband) ; Holyoke v. Jackson, supra note 9 (Washington legislature allowed
to take power of disposition of community property from husband and confer
it upon husband and wife jointly).
Calif. Sts. 1917, ch. 583, sec. 2.
'La. Rev. Civ. Code, Iglz, art. 2404; Guice v. Lawrence, supra note 2.
'Ariz. Rev. Sts. 1913, secs. 2o6I and 3850; Calif. Sts. 1917, ch. 583, sec. 2;
Idaho Comp. Sts. 1919, ch. 184, sec. 4666; N. M. Sess. Laws, 1915, ch. 84, sec. I;
Wash. Comp. Sts. 1922, sec. 6893. See La Tourette v. La Tourette, supra
note IO.
2 Tex. Civ. & Cr. Sts. Supp. 1922, art. 4621.
" 1 Nev. Rev. Laws, 1912, sec. 216o.
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true of a conveyance of the -homestead. Apparently a sole conveyance
even to a bona fide purchaser is void in Idaho and New Mexico.24
Although the husband has the control and power of disposition of the
personal property, he has no power to give it away without the wife's
consent, 25 at least not in fraud of her.
28
In spite of the general tendency, however, strong limitations on the
wife's power over the community property still cling. If she prede-
ceases her husband, one-half of the community property is subject to
her testamentary disposition in only half of the community property
states,--Arizona, Idaho, Louisiana, and Washington ;27 also in Nevada
when the husband has abandoned her without having grounds for
divorce ;2s and in New Mexico only the portion which may have been
set apart for her by judicial decree.2 9  In Texas her descendants take
one-half ;'0 but in California, Nevada and New Mexico, under usual
" Ewald v. Huf ton, supra note Io. ". . .. any transfer or conveyance attempted
to be made of the real property of the community by either husband or wife
alone shall be void and of no effect." N. M. Sess. Laws, I915, ch. 84, sec. i;
but in California "the sole lease, contract, mortgage or deed of the husband,
holding the record title to community real property, to. a lessee, purchaser or
encumbrancer, in good faith without knowledge of the marriage relation shall
be presumed to be valid; but no action to avoid such instrument shall be com-
menced after the expiration of one year from the filing for record of such
instrument in the recorder's office in the county in which the land is situate."
Calif. Sts. 1917, ch. 583, sec. 2. In view of this last provision the California
courts would probably now allow the wife during the marriage to bring an
action to set aside a transfer of community realty by the husband. See supra
note i6. Burnham v. Hardy, supra note 8. "Whenever any person, married or
single, having in his or her name the legal title of record to any real estate, shall
sell or dispose of the same to an actual bona fide purchaser, a deed of such real
estate from the person holding such legal record title to such actual bona fide
purchaser shall be sufficient to convey to and vest in such purchaser the full
legal and equitable title to such real estate free and clear of any and all claims
of any and all persons whatsoever not appearing of record in the auditor's office
of the county in which such real estate is situated." Wash. Comp. Sts. 1922,
sec. 10577.
Calif. Sts. 1917, ch. 583, sec. i; La. Rev. Civ. Code, 1912, art. 24o4 (excep-
tion that husband may give away community property for the establishment of
the children of the marriage) ; N. M. Sts. Ann. 1915, ch. 55, sec. 2766; Ramsey
v. Beck (1922) IS La. 1po, 91 So: 674; Marston v. Rue, supra note 9.
" Grisly v. Hudgens (1922) 23 Ariz. 339, 203 Pac. 569; Hall v. Johns, supra
note 1o; Nixon v. Brown, supra note 2 (husband may make a voluntary disposi-
tion of the community property, reasonable in reference to the whole) ; Wright
v. Hays (1853) 1o Tex. 13o. But after the wife was abandoned by the husband
a gift by her of the community property was good. See Wright v. Hays, supra.
'Ariz. Sess. Laws, 1921, ch. 7, sec. i; Idaho Comp. Sts. 1919, ch. 287, sec.
7803 (her testamentary disposition must be in favor of her children or parents
and she can leave only one-half of her share to her parents) ; La. Rev. Civ. Code,
1912, arts. 915 & 916; Wash. Comp. Sts. 1922, sec. 1342.
i Nev. Rev. Laws, 1912, sec. 2164.
N. M. Sts. Ann. 1915, ch. 29, see. 184o.
'Tex. Complete Sts. I92O, art. 2469; Veramendi v. Hutchins (1878) 48 Tex.
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circumstances all the community property belongs to the husband in
case of the wife's prior death.3 1 If the husband predeceases the wife,
subject to community debts, she always takes one-half of the community
property,32 and no inheritance tax is charged on this half.8 If her
husband does not will away his half and leaves no descendants, she takes
it all,3 4 except in California and 'New Mexico.35 In general the com-
munity property is liable f9 r the separate obligations of the husband"
but not of the wife.3
7
Since women have obtained equal suffrage and have so extensively
entered business, their growing demands for a revision of property
laws are inevitable. To meet these demands it has been suggested
that the community property system might be adopted in other states.88
But aside from other objections, so long as the husband has the full
power of management and control of the community property, so that
during her life the wife has no use of it except such as is allowed by
her husband, the system will not meet the approval of the women who
desire equality with their husbands in property affairs. In the com-
munity property states, statutes giving the wife control of her own earn-
ings and those of her minor children 8 are tending in the right direction,
as are also those transferring the control and management of the corn-
Calif. Civ. Code, 1915, sec. 1401; I Nev. Rev. Laws, 1912, sec. 2164; N. M.
Sts. Ann. 1915, ch. 29, sec. 184o.
'Ariz. Sess. Laws, 1921, ch. 7, sec. I; Calif. Civ. Code, 1915, sec. 1402; Idaho
Comp. Sts. I919, ch. 287, sec. 78o3; La. Rev. Civ. Code, 19I2, art. 915; i Nev. Rev.
Laws, i912, sec. 2165; N. M. Sts. Ann. 1915, ch. 29, sec. 1841; Tex. Complete
Sts. 192o, art. 2469; Wash. Comp. Sts. 1922, sec. 1342.
Calif. Sts. 1917, ch. 589, sec. i; Blum v. Wardell (192o, N. D. Calif.) 27o
Fed. 309; Kohny v. Dunbar (1912) 21 Idaho, 258, 121 Pac. 544; In re Williams'
Estate, supra note IO; contra in California before the statute, see supra note 12.
Ariz. Sess. Laws, 192I, ch. 7, sec. i; Idaho Comp. Sts. 1919, ch. 287, sec.
7803; La. Rev. Civ. Code, 1912, art. 915; I Nev. Rev. Laws, 1912, sec. 2165;
Tex. Complete Sts. 192o, art. 2469; Wash. Comp. Sts. 1922, sec. 1342.
Calif. Civ. Code, 1915, sec. 1402 (husband's share goes to certain descendants
or in same manner as his separate property) ; N. M. Sts. Ann. 1915, ch. 29, sec.
1841 (one-fourth goes to the wife and the remainder to the children, and further
according to the law of descent and distribution).
Wi Nev. Rev. Laws, 1912, sec. 2165; N. M. Sts. Ann. I915, ch. 29, sec. 1841;
Tex. Civ. & Cr. Sts. Supp. 1922, art. 4621; Villescas v. Ariz. Copper Co. (I919)
2o Ariz. 268, 179 Pac. 963; Van Marzn v. Johnson (i86O) I5 Calif. 308; Holt v.
EBnpey (I91) 32 Idaho, io6, 178 Pac. 703; contra: Brotton v. Langert (1890)
i Wash. 73, 23 Pac. 688. Evans, Community Obligations (1922) io CAiUF. L. REv.
120; (1923) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 405; ibid. 626.
Ariz. Rev. Sts. 1913, sec. 3852; N. M. Sts. Ann. 1915, ch. 55, sec. 2765; Tex.
Civ. & Cr. Sts. Supp. 1922, art. 4621 (except for necessaries) ; Travers v. Barrett
(19oo) 3o Nev. 402, 97 Pac. 126.
' Reiter, loc. cit. supra note 14.
Idaho Comp. Sts. i919, ch. x84, sec. 4667; Nev. Rev. Laws, I919, sec. 216b,
p. 2183; Tex. Complete Sts. 192o, art. 4622. The Nevada statute includes the
earnings of her minor children living with her.
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munity property to the wife when she is abandoned by her husband.4"
Even better is the suggestion found in the first draft of the code com-
missioners of California providing that, "In cases of fraudulent trans-
fers, gross mismanagement or profligate waste of common property by
the husband, the wife may have her action in the proper court, and is
upon proper showing, entitled to a judgment-I. Securing to her the
entire management and absolute . . . . disposition of it . . . ; or,
2. Appointing a trustee to manage it, as the court may direct; or
3. Equitably dividing the property, making the part awarded to each
their separate property." 41 The provision was intended to aid the
*wife who had "no remedy except by divorce or death." Even to-day
where the husband is profligate or simply a poor business manager,
the wife is still without a remedy. It is too unusual to suggest a
system dividing into halves all the property which now comes under
the community, including the earnings of both, making one-half the
separate property of the husband and the other the separate property
of the wife, and giving each the power to control, manage, and dispose
of his or her half togethef with the power of assigning this right to
the other or to a trustee?
SERVICE OF PROCESS UPON FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
At common law a corporation could not be sued unless service of
summons was made upon its head officer.1 Such service was conceived
to be impossible in the case of foreign corporations, because it was said
that the officer dropped his official capacity as soon as he left the state
of incorporation.2 The centralization of industry and commerce into
" "Whenever the husband is non compos mentis or has been convicted of a
felony and sentenced to imprisonment for a period of more than one year or
has abandoned his wife and family and left .... his family . . . . without
support or is an habitual drunkard or for any other reason is incapacitated to
manage and administer the community property the wife may present a peti-
tion .... to the .... court .... praying that she be substituted for her
husband, as the head of said community .... ." N. M. Sts. Ann. iI5, ch. 55,
sec. 2767. See Carothers v. McNese (1875) 43 Tex. 2i. If her husband
abandons her the wife can charge the community property for necessaries. Hall
v. Johns, supra note io. The common law rule that where a husband abandons
his wife without reasonable cause he is liable for her necessaries, is analogous.
I Schouler, Marriage, Divorce, Separation and Domestic Relations (6th ed.
i92I) sec. 101.
"1 Calif. Civ. Code, x915, note to sec. x72.
'See State v. Western N. C. R. R. (1883) 89 N. C. 584; Kansas City R. R. v.
Daughtery (i8gi) 138 U. S. 298, 11 Sup. Ct. 306.
'McQueen v. Middletowm Mfg. Co. (i8ig, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 16 Johns. 5, 7;
Peckhan v. Inhabitants in Haverhill (834, Mass.) 16 Pick. 274, 286; Middle-
brooks v. Springfield Ins. Co. (841) 14 Conn. 301; Sullivan v. LaCrosse Co.
(1865) IO Minn. 386. With respect to natural persons, where a defendant is a
resident of the state in which suit is brought, actual or constructive service may
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corporate interests and the spread of countless corporate organizations
into foreign jurisdictions made a change from this ruling imperative.a
The simplest method of making it possible to bring action against a f or-
eign corporation in a state where it did business was to make it a con-
dition precedent to the privilege of doing business in a foreign state
'that it should consent to submit to the courts of that state upon service
of process on its designated agent or representative in that state.'
The next step was the ruling by the United States Supreme Court that
a state statute providing for service of process upon foreign corpora-
tions impliedly iinposed such a condition, and that a judgmeni obtained
against a foreign corporation was valid if the corporation had an agent
and was doing business within the state.5
confer jurisdiction on the court to adjudicate upon his personal liability, regard-
less of whether the defendant is within the state. Where he is a non-resident,
he must be served personally within the state. Pennoyer v. Neff (1877) 95 U. S.
714; (ii8) 18 CoL. L. REv. 67; (1917) 17 CoL. L. Rv. 441.
'The English cases departed from the old ruling by reasoning that if we are
to consider corporations as a group constituting a natural unit upon which the
state has conferred personality, just as it has upon individuals who are also
natural units, then we must allow the corporation the attributes of group unity.
One of these is the capacity to be present in several places at once. See Carron
Iron Co. v. Maclaren (1855) 5 H. L. Cas. 416, followed by Compagnie Ginerale
v. T. Law & Cb. [i899, H. L.] A. C. 431. For an American case using the same
general reasoning see Marlin v. Trenton Mut. Ins. Co. (1853, Sup. Ct.) 24
N. J. L. 2=.
'Inasmuch as a corporation is not a citizen within the meaning of the comity
clause of the federal constitution (art. IV, sec. 2) or within the meaning of the
privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment, a state may
exclude it altogether or impose conditions precedent to its doing business within
the state provided it is not engaged in interstate commerce and is-not a govern-
mental agency. Paul v. Virginia (1868, U. S.) 8 Wall. 168; Anglo-American
Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co. (1903) 191 U. S. 373, 24 Sup. Ct. 92;
Beale, Foreign Corporations (igo4) sees. 74, 117; Scott, Jurisdiction over Non-
residents doing Business within a State (igig) 32 HARV. L. Rxv. 871. It seems
from recent cases that the Supreme Court is gradually extending the doctrine
that the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment only
applies to those corporations doing business within the state. Southern Ry. v.
Greene (191o) 216 U. S. 400, 30 Sup. Ct. 287; Bethlehem Motors Corp. v. Flynt
(1921) 256 U. S. 421, 41 Sup. Ct. 571; Kentucky Finance Corp. v. Paramount
Auto. Exchange Corp. (1923, U., S.) 43 Sup. Ct.. 636.
'St. Clair v. Cox (1883) io6 U. S. 35o. This consent theory has been attacked
as fallacious on the argument that the true basis for the state power is that
when a corporation acts within a foreign state the corporation should be bound
by the laws of that state, as in the case of natural persons. Cahill, Jurisdiction
over Foreign Corporations and Individuals Who Carry on Business Within the
Territory (1917) 3o HARV. L. Rav. 676, 689. The maxim that every one is pre-
sumed to know the law, means that the law is applicable to him whether or not
he knows the law in fact. So here, the implication of consent means, not that
the foreign corporation actually consents, but that service upon the corporate
agent gives jurisdiction whether or not it has in fact consented.
The commonest type of statute forbids the doing of business in the state
before the filing of. a written consent to the jurisdiction of the state courts.
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It is impossible to state any general rule as to what constitutes the
doing of business, for the purpose of jurisdiction. The maintenance of
an office with an agent to solicit business and authorized to receive pay-
ments for specified purposes seems to be sufficient.
6 A foreign cor-
poration owning property in the state but doing no business there is
not subject to service of summons unless the property is attached.7
Isolated business visits by corporate officers do not, in themselves, con-
stitute a doing of business within the state." It is always a question of
Such statutes usually require the designation of one or more parties on whom
process may be served. Others provide that the service on a foreign corpora-
tion may be made in the same manner as upon a domestic corporation. A few
states seem to have no special provision at all. But then it seems that a foreign
corporation doing business in the state may be served in the way provided for
domestic corporations. Cahill, op. cit. supra, at p. 69o. That the corporation
must be doing business within the state, see International Harvester Co. v.
Kentucky (1914) 234 U. S. 579, 34 Sup. Ct. 944; (1922) 35 HArv. L. Rrv. 87.
The process will bevalid only if served upon some authorized agent. Philadel-
phia & R. Ry. v. McKibbin (1917) 243 U. S. 264, 37 Sup. Ct. 280; (Ig22) 31
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'International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, supra note 5. Otherwise if the
agent has no authority to receive payments. Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry.
(19o7) 205 U. S. 530, 27 Sup. Ct. 595. It has been held that it is not enough for
a foreign corporation to authorize a domestic concern to sell tickets at a com-
mission for passage on its ships. Goepfert v. Compagnie Ginirale (1907, E. D.
Pa.) 156 Fed. 196. Commercial Accident Co. v. Davis (19o9) 213 U. S. 245, 29
Sup. Ct. 445, seems to hold that a state statute may prescribe what agent may
be served, if the corporation is doing business within the state. A judgment
against non-resident individuals though members of a partnership doing business
in the state, on service of summons on their agent in charge of the business, is
v.oid for want of due process. As citizens of one state, unlike a foreign corpora-
tion, cannot be prohibited from doing business in another state, they do not
consent to be bound by the prescribed service of that state. Flexner v. Farson
(1919) 248 U. S. 289, 39 Sup. Ct. 97.
' See Caledonian Coal Co. v. Baker (i9o5) 196 U. S. 432, 25 Sup. Ct. 375.
Where -property of the corporation was attached in New York and service was
made upon the officer temporarily within the state, there was held to be no
jurisdiction. Brandow v. Murray (1922, ist Dept.) 203 App. Div. 47, I96 N. Y.
Supp. 293.
'Riverside Mills v. Menefee (1915) 237 U. S. 189, 35 Sup. Ct. 579; see Hoyt v.
Ogden Cement Co. (1911, C. C. N. D. N. Y.) 185 Fed. 889, 899; Bagdon v.
Phila. & Reading C. & I. Co. (1916) 217 N. Y. 432, 111 N. E. 1075; Dollar Co.
v. Canadian C. & F. Co. (1917) 22o N. Y. 270, 115 N. E. 711; Beale, op. cit.
supra note 4, sec. 27o. The earlier New York decisions followed a contrary
ruling. Pope v. Terre Haute Car & Mfg. Co. (188i) 87 N. Y. 137. Evdn
where an agent of a foreign corporation comes into the state to represent his
company with reference to the subject matter of the suit, it has been said that
it does not of itself constitute a doing of business. Commercial Mutual Accident
Co. v. Davis, supra note 6. But the dictum has not been followed in Premo
Specialty Mfg. Co. v. Jersey Cremhe Co. (1912, C. C. A. 9th) 20o Fed. 352. In
other jurisdictions the dictum is followed where the contract was executed in
a state other than the state of suit. Louden Mfg. Co. v. American Malleable
Iron Co. (19o4, C. C. S. D. Iowa) 127 Fed. ioo8; see Painter v. Colorado
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fact for each case,9 and the United States Supreme Court has the final
word.'0
In considering the development of this problem in the United States,
it is not so much a question of what jurisdiction has been conferred
upon the courts; that is entirely statutory. The important thing is to
determine what jurisdiction can be conferred under accepted constitu-
tional limitations." It has been contended that service upon an officer
of a foreign corporation within the jurisdiction is sufficient to make the
corporation amenable to the courts of that jurisdiction, even though
the corporation did no business or owned no property within the state.
Some courts even asserted that while this was good service of process
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, a personal
judgment issued upon it would not be such a judgment as other states
would recognize under the full faith and credit clause of the contitu-
tion . 2  Following this ruling literally, it would be possible to com-
mence an action against a foreign corporation upon any service which
would be sufficient as against a domestic corporation, and a judgment so
secured would be valid for every purpose within the state of suit.
Whether the foreign corporation was doing business or had property in
the state would be immaterial as to the validity of the judgment there.'3
This distinction between the operation and effect of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment and the full faith and credit clause
has been expressly overruled by a federal Supreme Court case holding
that the courts of one state may not without a violation of the due process
clause render a judgment against a foreign corporation where it has
not come into the state for the purpose of doing Lusiness, has no property
Springs & C. C. D. R. Co. (i9o7) 127 Mo. App. 248, 104 S. W. 1139; 43 L. R. A.
(N. s.) 1oi5, hote; io L. R. A. (N. s.) 693, note; 24 L. R. A. 289, note.
'See People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co. (1918) 246 U. S. 79, 87,
38 Sup. Ct. 233, 235.
"Dollar Co. v. Canadian C. & F. Co., supra note 8; (1922) 22 CoL. L. REv.
83. In recognition of this principle courts have gone so far as to interpret a
statute authorizing, without qualification, service of process upon a foreign
corporation as meaning service of process upon only those foreign corporations
which are doing business within the state. Wisconsin Cattle Co. v. Oregon
Short Line R. R. (igo) Io5 Minn. 198, 117 N. W. 391; (1917) 1 MiNN. L. REv.
192. Activities in a state insufficient to make it take out a license may be suffi-
cient to render it amenable to process. International Text Book Co. v. Tone
(917) 22o N. Y. 313, 115 N. E. 914. And, while a corporation doing an exclu-
sive interstate business in a foreign jurisdiction may not be required to procure
a license as a condition precedent to the privilege to do such business, it may
through its servants be subject to service of process. Tauza v. Susquehanna
Coal Co. (1917) 22o N. Y. 259, 115 N. E. 915.
Cahill, op. cit. supra note 5.
"Menefee v. Riverside Cotton Mills (i912) I6I N. C. 164, 76 S. E. 741; cf.
Cunningham 7). Express Co. (1872) 67 N. C. 425; Whitehurst v. Kerr (igio)
153 N. C. 76, 68 S. E. 913.
'This seems to have been the actual contention made by early New York
cases. Pope v. Terre Haute Car & Mfg. Co., supra note 8.
COMMENTS
therein, and has no qualified agent upon whom process may be served.
14
But the court has developed another distinction between service upon a
voluntary and an involuntary agent of a corporation. Where an agent
is appointed for the service of process in accordance with a state statute,
it gives the state jurisdiction for actions arising not only within that
state but in any foreign jurisdiction.' 5 But where no agent is appointed
and service has to be made on a person named by the statute, usually
the secretary of state, the jurisdiction of the state is restricted to causes
arising within the state.' The reasons for this distinction is not made
clear by the decisions.
The recent case of Davis v. Farmers Codperative Equity (1923,
U.S.) 43 Sup. Ct. 556 indicates that there is another limitation on the
power of the states. A Minnesota statute providing that "any foreign
corporation having an agent in this state for the solicitation of freight
or passenger traffic or either thereof over its lines outside of this state.
may be served with summons by delivering a copy thereof to such
agent" was held unconstitutional as to any controversy arising outside
the state on the ground that it was an unreasonable burden upon inter-
state commerce. It seems then that the federal supreme court has
fixed arbitrary and definite limits to a state's power respecting service
upon foreign corporations.
"Riverside Mills v. Menefee, supra note 8.
'Bagdon v. Phila. & Reading C. & L Co., supra note 8; Pa. Fire Ins. Co. v.
Gold Issue M. & M. Co. (1917) 243 U. S. 93, 37 Sup. Ct. 344; Johnston v. Trade
Ins. Co. (1882) 132 Mass. 432.
"Old Wayne Life Ass. v. McDonough (19o7) 2o4 U. S. 8, 27 Sup. Ct. 236;
Simon v. Southern Ry. (1914) 236 U. S. 115, 35 Sup. Ct. 255.
